Abstract-With the popularity of smart devices and the widespread use of machine learning methods, smart edges have become the mainstream of dealing with wireless big data. When smart edges use machine learning models to analyze wireless big data, nevertheless, some models may unintentionally store a small portion of the training data with sensitive records. Thus, intruders can expose sensitive information by careful analysis of this model. To solve this privacy issue, in this paper, we propose and implement a machine learning strategy for smart edges using differential privacy. We focus our attention on privacy protection in training datasets in wireless big data scenario. Moreover, we guarantee privacy protection by adding Laplace mechanisms, and design two different algorithms Output Perturbation (OPP) and Objective Perturbation (OJP), which satisfy differential privacy. In addition, we consider the privacy preserving issues presented in the existing literatures for differential privacy in the correlated datasets, and further provided differential privacy preserving methods for correlated datasets, guaranteeing privacy by theoretical deduction. Finally, we implement the experiments on the TensorFlow, and evaluate our strategy on four datasets, i.e., MNIST, SVHN, CIFAR-10 and STL-10. The experiment results show that our methods can efficiently protect the privacy of training datasets and guarantee the accuracy on benchmark datasets.
INTRODUCTION
C URRENTLY, smart edges have received extensive attention in the data processing, data analysis and data storage in wireless big data scenario [1] . Smart edges bring enormous benefits in the aspect of analyzing and mining data, perceiving location information, such as localization and low latency [2] . Some wireless big data, e.g., broadband download, online business, health sensing, etc [3] , contains a lot of analysis and mining of effective information. However, it is inevitable to involve some privacy records when the smart edges use machine learning methods for data processing and prediction, such as license plates, tax information, personal assets information [4] . In recent years, it is often seen that hackers have exploited privacy holes in machine learning, and restored private sensitive training data from the model. Fredrikson et al. [5] used the privacy leak of the computer vision classifier to expose the personal picture information from the training data. Thus, the problem of data privacy in machine learning is becoming more and more serious, especially for the privacy protection of training datasets M. Du is with the Key Laboratory of Broadband Wireless Communication and Sensor Network Technology, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing, China (e-mail: dumiao0118@163.com).
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(Corresponding authors: Kun Wang and Yan Zhang) [6] . Once the data with sensitive information is maliciously attacked, it is most likely to be exploited by criminals.
To guarantee the privacy protection of the training datasets, this paper first analyzes the possible privacy issues faced by the training datasets for smart edges in wireless big data scenario. There are a large number of personal edge nodes and business edge nodes in the smart edges, as shown in Fig. 1 , and they own a certain ability to compute and process data. These nodes can make use of the edge cloud to make the network cooperate with the terminals, which can achieve the business localization processing, the service delay reduction, and the network efficiency promotion [7] . As the most popular methods of data analysis, machine learning can efficiently analyze and mine valuable information hidden behind the wireless big data. From the figure, we can see that smart edge nodes can analyze a variety of different wireless big data by using machine learning methods [8] . For example, the analysts establish a machine learning model to analyze and predict the results of medical diagnosis, which is more conductive to the prediction and resolution of problems. Analysts can find out the common features of cancer patients by sorting out massive training datasets, thereby providing better help in diagnosing cancer. On the other hand, however, intruders may invade certain sensitive data individuals in datasets to achieve their ulterior motives. That is exactly the great challenge in privacy preserving at present: how to ensure that analysts are not likely to cause sensitive data leakage when analyzing data in machine learning model? Fortunately, differential privacy algorithm is a promising technology solution that can alleviate this tension [9] . This approach allows analysts to perform benign aggregation analysis while ensuring that personal privacy is effectively protected.
Differential privacy makes a great contribution in the aspects of input disturbances, data publishing, output perturbations, etc [10] , because this algorithm can add Laplacian noise to make input disturbances and output perturbations, respectively. This method ensures that the training data acquired by attackers is not much difference between what they can achieve from individual data that no one has ever recorded [11] . Since sensitive individual information is almost completely irrelevant to the output of the system, users can be sure that the organization that processes their data cannot violate their privacy.
Most existing literatures [11, 12, 13, 14] mainly address privacy issues in network data publishing, which are mainly aimed at dealing with different privacy models for different privacy requirements. Some literatures [15, 16, 17] focus on preventing nodes from re-identifying the relevant attribute information revealed by the adversaries. Others [18, 19] consider privacy threats due to edge disclosures, allowing adversaries to learn sensitive relationships among individuals. Nevertheless, little attention has been paid to the study of privacy issues for machine learning training datasets. To address the privacy issues of training data, this paper shows how to enhance the training data privacy assurance by adding Laplace noise [20] . Since each node in the edge network has a certain computational power, we block the data into each node for data processing and training, and then summarize the training datasets for further data prediction. In order to prevent privacy leaks during the use of training data, we add appropriate noise into the summarized training datasets, and use differential privacy methods to ensure its privacy and security. Moreover, considering that any node may have privacy problems when dealing with the data, we add noise to the blocked data in advance, and then compute and process it by each edge node, which further strengthening the performance of privacy preserving.
In addition, existing researches [21, 22, 23, 24] on differential privacy assume that the sampling of data is independent and identically distributed (IID). In practice, however, most of the records in the datasets are related, and these datasets are defined as correlated datasets [22] . Differential privacy technique is imperfectly effective for privacy preserving on a correlated dataset [23] . Correlated differential privacy has become a crucial problem that needs to be solved. At present, limited efforts have been made in correlated differential privacy. Kifer et al. [24] was the first to propose that differential privacy reduces privacy guarantees on the correlated datasets if the correlation between records is not taken into account. Some genetic diseases, for instance, are likely to spread among family members. If a hacker knows that one person suffers from an illness, he is likely to infer the health of the rest of the family. An attacker with relevant information knowledge will have higher access to privacy information. Therefore, how to satisfy the strict differential privacy in the correlated datasets is another challenge to be solved. In this paper, we proposed and implemented a machine learning strategy with differential privacy that provides utility, accuracy and privacy preserving. Our main contributions are summarized as follows: 1) We focused on the privacy issues of the training datasets for smart edges, and proposed a machine learning strategy using differential privacy in wireless big data scenario. 2) We designed two different algorithms, i.e., Output Perturbation (OPP) and Objective Perturbation (OJP) to satisfy differential privacy. Experimental results demonstrated that the proposed algorithms can address the training data privacy issues effectively. 3) We offered differential privacy preserving methods for correlated datasets. Through theoretical verification, we ensure that our proposed differential privacy algorithms can achieve high quality privacy preserving in a variety of different datasets, including correlated datasets. 4) We setup the experiments on the Tensorflow with differential privacy, and evaluated our strategy on four datasets, MNIST, SVHN, CIFAR-10 and STL-10. We compared our OPP and OJP algorithms with two benchmark protocols, i.e., stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [25] , generative adversarial networks (GANs) with private aggregation of teacher ensembles (PATE-G) [26] , in terms of prediction accuracy, data utility and privacy. Experimental results show that the proposed methods can effectively protect the privacy of the training datasets and guarantee the accuracy. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the system model in this paper. Then, we present the theoretical analysis in Section 3. After that, we describe the implementation and experiment results in Section 4. Some related literatures are reviewed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 draws the conclusion.
SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first introduce the differential privacy preliminaries. Then we propose the system model, and two different algorithms are proved to satisfy differential privacy, thereby sensitive data can be effectively protected.
Differential Privacy Preliminaries
, and x i 2 1. ( x , x 2 , and x H represent the l1 norm, the l2 norm, and the H norm in the Hilbert space [27] , respectively.)
In order to measure the quality of the prediction function u : X → Y in the training datasets, the empirical risk minimization method is employed to minimize the K(u,D) with a nonnegative loss function s :
where Z(u) represents the smoothness of a function, u is a linear prediction function, and λ is an adjustable parameter. Definition 1. A randomized function M with domain D and range R gives e εp differentially private [28] , i.e.,
for all D, D differing in at most one element, where P is disclosure risk, and data privacy is protected when the condition of Eq. (2) is satisfied. Definition 2. Let A : D → R be a randomized mechanism and D, D are a pair of adjacent databases. The output of algorithm A satisfies ε p differentially private [28] , i.e.,
for all D, D differing in at most one element, where µ(.) is a conditional distribution metric, induced by the output of the algorithm A.
It can be seen that the output of the general empirical minimization is not satisfied by differential privacy. The reason is that when some training samples are close to our chosen boundary, the solution of empirical risk minimization is a linear combination. Dwork [29] proposed a method of adding characteristic distribution noise to the output function to protect private data. Definition 3. For a random function t : (R m ) n → R, the sensitivity of t is viewed as
(4) According to Definition 3, we add the Laplacian mechanism [29] as follows. Definition 4. For a random function t : (R m ) n → R with sensitivity t, Laplacian mechanism returns
where Lap(.) is a random variable, which has the following probability density function
Output Perturbation Algorithm (OPP)
We assume the datasets
..,(x n ,y n )}, and suppose that the outputs of the algorithm are W (D) and W (D ), respectively. For the objective function W (D) = argminK(u,D), the output of the algorithm is W (D) + q, where q is a random Laplace noise, and its density function is:
where α is a standardized constant, ω is a function of the sensitivity of the variable ε p and l 2 . W (D) is an empirical minimization solution. Both the loss function and the regularization are derivable and strongly convex [30] . The strong convexity is defined as follows. Definition 5. Suppose that T (u) is defined as a function on a variable u ∈ R d , for all the u, v, and α ∈ (0,1), if satisfied
the function T is strictly convex. Under the same conditions, if satisfied:
then the function T is strongly convex. Lemma 1. If L(u) and J(u) are known to be two vector functions, and all points are continuous and differentiable, both L(u) and L(u) + J(u) are strongly convex. Suppose that
, then we have:
Proof : From the definition of u 1 and u 2 , it can be obtained according to its continuous differentiability:
Since L(u) is strongly convex, we have
According to Cauchy inequality [30] , we obtain
then both sides are divided by λ u 1 − u 2 2 , we have Eq. (10).
Lemma 2. If Z(.) is differentiable and strongly convex, s is convex, and the function is differentiable. For all the input data A, if satisfied |s (a)| 1, then the maximum sensitivity is 2 nλ . Proof : It is known that the datasets D = {(x 1 ,y 1 ),...,(x n ,y n )} and D = {(x 1 ,y 1 ),...,(x n ,y n )}, for all D, D differing in at most one element. In other words, only (x n ,y n ) and (x n ,y n ) deal with privacy issues. Suppose that
and
then we have
Since the strong convexity of the loss function s, and the Z(.) is strongly convex, thereby
And Since the differentiability of Z(.) and s(a), L(u) and J(u) are derivable, we have
For all the A, we have
For all the u, we have
Theorem 1. If Z(.) is differentiable and strongly convex, the loss function s is convex and differentiable, and for all data A, the algorithm OPP satisfies ε p -differential privacy.
Proof : According to Lemmas 1 and 2, if Z(.) is strongly convex, then the maximum sensitivity is 2 nλ . For a particular vector q 0 ∈ R d , The probability density
q0 . For all the u, it should satisfy:
where q is the noise vector in algorithm OPP, and p(q 1 ) and p(q 2 ) are the density functions of the output functions at different input data. According to Lemma 2, we have
Substituting into the upper formula, we can obtain
Objective Perturbation Algorithm (OJP)
Unlike algorithm OPP, this algorithm adds a noise to the objective function itself, and then produces a minimization of the objective disturbance. Suppose that
where q is with the same density as algorithm OPP, and ω = ε p . We further assume that u p is the output of the algorithm OJP. Suppose that
. By approximating the minimization, we have
Theorem 2. If the matrix R is full rank and the maximum rank of Q is 2, then we have:
where λ r (R) is the rth eigenvalue of matrix R. Proof : Since the maximum rank of Q is 2, the rank of R −1 Q is at most 2. According to
Theorem 3. If Z(.) is strongly convex and second derivable, the loss function s(.) satisfies the convexity of all sample data A and is derivable, then the algorithm OJP satisfies ε p -differential privacy. Proof : For complete proof, see Appendix A. Currently, most of the data on privacy issues are based on independent and identically distributed (IID) dataset, but the requirements of IID are too strong. In reality, many of the data are interrelated datasets, and do not satisfy the independent distribution. Therefore, it is necessary to study the privacy security of non-IID datasets. To this end, we will make a thorough inquiry on correlated datasets in the next section.
CORRELATED DATASET ANALYSIS
In this section, we further investigate the correlated differential privacy problem thoroughly. First, we provide the related definitions of correlated datasets. Then, the theoretical analysis proves that the proposed algorithms satisfy the differential privacy conditions in correlated datasets.
Correlated Datasets
We first make the following definitions on correlated datasets. Definition 6. Suppose that for all t and non negative integers m, a dataset of random variables ϑ = {ϑ t } ∞ t= -∞ satisfies that (ϑ t ,...,ϑ t+m ) and (ϑ t+k ,...,ϑ t+m+k ) have the same distribution, then ϑ = {ϑ t } ∞ t= -∞ is a stationary distribution [32] . Definition 7. Suppose that for all i,j ∪ { -∞,+∞}, and any positive integer µ, if the dataset
where σ j i is a random variable, and i µ j. If γ(µ) → 0, then ϑ is a correlated dataset. Definition 8. If the data sample is D ∈ X n and T is a realvalued function, then the Rademacher complexity is:
where σ = (σ 1 ,σ 2 ,...,σ n ) is a random variable, and σ i is an independent random variable with a value of {−1,+1}. 
Proof : Since the loss function is bounded, and 0 < s(ϑ,u α ) < M , we have
Moreover,
According to Eq. (30), we can obtain
Assuming that K = Z(T, ε 2 ). For ∀s(ϑ,u α ) ∈ T , according to the Berstein inequality [33] , we have
Since
that is
).
Then we can obtain Eq. (28) via changing element.
Theorem 5.
Suppose that ϑ is a correlated dataset of stationary distributions, and ϑ = (ϑ 1 ,ϑ 2 ,...ϑ m ) is the data in the correlated dataset. The variance of the loss function is D(s(ϑ,u α )) σ 2 , for all the ε > 0, we have:
Proof : Suppose that π m (p) = sup|R(u α ) − R emp (u α )|. Since p * and p have the same edge density function, then π(p*) = π(p). Assuming that the number of input training data is n, and l n = n kn , then we have n = k n l n + c n , and 0 c n k n − 1.
Thus, we have |P {sup|π n,t (p)|} − P * {sup|π n,t (p)|}| lγ(s), t s r (l − 1)γ(s) r + 1 t s (40) Stated thus, we can obtain
Then according to Theorem 4, we can obtain the Eq. (35).
Privacy Analysis
We analyze the correlated privacy preserving performance of algorithms OPP and OJP, respectively. Definition 9. Suppose that for all sample data (
satisfies Lipschitz continuity [34] . Lemma 3. Suppose that X ∼ Γ(k,θ), d is an integer, then
Proof : Since d is an integer, X can be decomposed into
Lemma 4. Let Z(.) be second derivative, and ∇ 2 Z(u) η. The loss function is differentiable and continuous, and satisfies Lipschitz continuity, then we have 2 ,δ > 0, then we have:
where u p is the output of algorithm OPP. Proof : Suppose that a given function u 0 , whose loss function is s(u 0 ) = s * . Let u t be an arbitrary function, if the training samples satisfy n > c
, then we have s(u t ) s(u 0 )+ ε p . Furthermore, assuming that
According to Eq. (66), we can obtain
Since Z(u) = 1 2 u 2 , then we have Z(u) 2 1. According to Lemmas 3 and 4, we have
According to Theorem 5 and Eq. (55), we can obtain
Combining with Eq. (68), we have
Assuming that λ + ∆ = εp u0
2 , and substituting it into Eq. (57), then we have Eq. (52).
In the above, we show that the algorithm OPP can satisfy the differential privacy of the correlated datasets. Next, we need to further prove that the algorithm OJP can also protect the privacy of the correlated datasets.
, the loss function s is differentiable and continuous, and Z(.) is strongly convex and differentiable, and s (ϑ) 1,ε p > 0, then we have:
where u p is the output of algorithm OJP, and ε p (1 − 2 ln10 )ε p . Proof : Similar to Theorem 6, we suppose that
According to Theorem 3, u p is the minimum output of
where
. Then we can obtain
Analogously, we can obtain Eq. (58). We further demonstrate the conditions for meeting ε p .
Since n > c 2 , we have 
IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENT
In this section, we introduce the implementation of the proposed methodology, including hardware and software platforms, dataset description, and experimental setup.
Hardware and Software platforms
We make the experiments on an Intel Core i7-6700 with a 3.4GHz CPU and equipped with a NVIDIA Tesla K80 GPU accelerator. We use Tensorflow to program the machine learning code, and Tensorflow provides a good experimental platform for machine learning. It has the following advantages [35] : 1) Tensorflow is a lightweight software that supports the current popular programming language, Python. 2) Tensorflow can use multiple GPU on a single machine, and its workflow is relatively easy. 3) Tensorflow uses symbolic programming models to make programming flexible and efficient.
Dataset Description
The experiments involve four datasets:
• MNIST [36] : The MNIST dataset consists of handwritten digital images. We divide the 50,000 sample into the training dataset, and the 10,000 sample as the test set. All digital images are regularized in length and centered into 28 * 28 pixels.
• SVHN [37] : The SVHN dataset is a real-world image dataset. We divide the 72,048 digits for training, and the 25,964 digits for testing. The SVHN is achieved by house numbers in Google Street View images.
• CIFAR-10 [38] : The CIFAR-10 dataset consists of color images classified into 10 classes such as airplane, bird, and deer. We partition 50,000 samples into training examples and the 10,000 samples as the test examples. Each example is a 32 * 32 image.
• STL-10 [39] : The STL-10 dataset is similar to the CIFAR-10 dataset, but STL-10 has fewer labeled information than CIFAR-10 in the training dataset. All digital images are 96*96 pixels.
Experimental setup
We have implemented the differentially private OPP and OJP algorithms in TensorFlow. In order to protect data privacy, we need to use OPP Preprocessing function to complete the gradient of the update parameter. Moreover, we use OP-P Improvement function to minimize a loss function using differentially private OPP, and OPPTrain function, which calls OPP Improvement function for minimizing a loss function differentially privately.
In all experiments, the regularization coefficient is fixed to 10 −4 , and the setting for mini-batch size is 10. In addition, we change the number of participants in each OPP and OJP scenario between N=10 and 100. Approximately 1% of the entire dataset is randomly selected as the initial training dataset for each participant, i.e., 500 data samples for the CIFAR-10 scenario.
Experiment Results
In this section, the proposed methods are validated on realistic datasets. We compare our OPP and OJP algorithms with two existing algorithms, i.e., SGD and PATE-G, in regard to accuracy, data utility and privacy.
Accuracy
To verify the effectiveness of our methods compared with the existing mechanisms SGD and PATE-G, we evaluate the accuracy of OPP and OJP when training a machine learning on the MNIST, SVHN, CIFAR-10, and STL-10 datasets. In machine learning mechanisms, there are many parameters that can affect accuracy. We mainly consider the influence of these two parameters on the accuracy, which are α and ε, respectively. Taking the special status of the participants into account, in addition, we change the number of participants in each OPP and OJP scenario between N=10 and 100. In general, participants can optimize parameter values through calibrated training datasets. First, Fig. 2 shows that with the increase of value α, the accuracy of algorithm OJP on four datasets is continuously improved. Moreover, we find that it has a great impact on the accuracy when the value of α is small, with the number of participants N increases. However, when the value of α increases and reaches more than 0.5, the number of participants N has less impact on accuracy. From these four figures, we can obtain that our machine learning-based algorithms OPP and OJP, which can maintain good accuracy on these four datasets, include near 95% accuracy in MNIST and SVHN datasets.
Secondly, we further explore the effect of parameter ε on the accuracy. In this experiment, we compare our algorithms OPP and OJP with the existing SGD and PATE-G on four different datasets. As shown in Fig. 3 , our algorithms OPP and OJP embody superior accuracy. When the number of participants is N=10, the accuracy is improved as the value of parameter ε increases. Among them, algorithm OPP can achieve more than 90% accuracy in the MNIST dataset when the value of ε is between 5 and 10. The accuracy of algorithms OPP and OJP is also slightly higher than that of SGD and PATE-G on the other three datasets, and we find that the optimal value of ε is between 1 and 10 since excessive value will lead to an increase in privacy budgets. Fig. 4 shows that the accuracy of algorithms OPP and OJP on four datasets, i.e., MNIST, SVHN, CIFAR-10 and STL-10 when N=100. We can see that the accuracy is relatively poor when the number of participants increases and the initial value of ε is small. However, on the other hand, the accuracy increases significantly with the increase in the value of ε, indicating that the value of ε has an important effect on the accuracy. Furthermore, these results also confirm that more participants also play a certain role in the choice of calibration parameters. However, experiments show that an excessive number of participants can bring about a decrease in initial accuracy, and we have to substantially increase the value of ε to improve accuracy, which indirectly increases the privacy budget for privacy preserving. 
Quality of Privacy Preserving
We also evaluate the quality of privacy preserving. In this subsection, we make experiments to seek out the appropriate value of ε. As shown in Table I , two sets of comparative experiments are carried out on four different datasets, respectively. We assume that there are different amounts of queries in different training datasets, i.e, MNIST dataset has 100 and 1000 queries, respectively. First, we set ε = 2.06 and find that the accuracy of OPP and OJP is 97.01% and 96.88% when the number of queries is 100, which is slightly higher than that of SGD with 95.12% and PATE-G with 96.43%, respectively. Then we assume the number of queries is 1000, and find that the value of ε needs increasing to 8.23 to have favorable accuracy, i.e., the accuracy of SGD, PATE-G, OPP and OJP at this time are 94.47%, 93.82%, 95.23% and 94.67%, respectively. We can see that we should increase the privacy budget to ensure the accuracy when the queries are added. In addition, we have done the same experiments on the other three datasets SVHN, CIFAR-10, and STL-10, respectively. From Table I , we further observe that the accuracy of OPP and OJP is superior than that of SGD and PATE-G in most circumstances. With the injection of Laplace noise, machine learning methods can process and train data on different types of datasets. We might be able to think about introducing Laplace mechanisms into different machine learning methods to find suitable methods for processing corresponding datasets.
Data Utility
In this subsection, we consider the data utility in the experiments. We measure the data utility by means of the median cluster coefficient [22] . Fig. 5 shows that the median cluster coefficient increases continuously with the value of ε increases. We can see that when the value of ε is large, the median cluster coefficient of OPP is slightly better than that of OJP on the MNIST dataset, while the performance of the two is not much difference on the other three datasets. Additionally, our methods OPP and OJP are obviously superior to SGD and PATE-G in median cluster coefficient on all the four datasets.
From the figures, we find that when the value of ε is greater than 10 −2 , the median cluster coefficient can basically stay above 80%, and when the value of ε is close to 1, the median cluster coefficient can reach nearly 90% in these four datasets.
Moreover, taking into account the increase of ε will lead to an increase of privacy budget. There is no need to increase the value of ε while good data utility has been guaranteed, although this will further protect data privacy. In this experiment, we find that once the value of ε is too large and reaches a certain range, it will play a negative role in data utility. In other words, an excessive increase of ε can result in a reduction in data utility.
To this end, we can conclude that our methods OPP and OJP can effectively protect the privacy of the training datasets while ensuring excellent accuracy and data utility. It is worth noting that the value of ε cannot be too large, otherwise it will reduce the data utility. Experiments show that the range of a reasonable ε is between 10 −2 and 20.
RELATED WORK
In this section, we review the existing literatures on wireless big data, edge computing and differential privacy, respectively.
Wireless Big Data
In recent years, wireless big data has drawn many researchers' attention in the aspect of data collection and analytics, network architecture, privacy and security, and its application. Zhang and Qiu [40] proposed a compression aware collection strategy with the purpose of maintaining data quality while minimizing the amount of collected data. In addition, they presented a new idea of dealing with the energy shortage of wireless sensor nodes. Alsheikh et al. [41] introduced deep learning into wireless communication, and proposed an extensible learning architecture that supports distributed deep learning. Yang et al. [42] proposed a multi-cognitive agent network management architecture, and also presented a Markov game model, which is designed to provide a variety of learning technologies for wireless big data. Another significant area of research for wireless big data is about privacy and security. Hua et al. [43] proposed a differential privacy algorithm for generalization of time series trajectory data based on exponential mechanism. Mano et al. [44] proposed a steganography algorithm to hide user location, and can preserve the location dataset of user path information. Furtak et al. [45] proposed a symmetric encryption technique to protect data in sensor node memory.
In addition, much attention has been paid to the application of wireless big data. Pan et al. [46] proposed a method for dynamically clustering electric power consumption into wireless big data. Ahmad et al. [47] proposed a data collection architecture from the IoT equipment to the social network, which can be used to analyze big data collection and reflect real-time intelligent city scenario.
Edge Computing
Satyanarayan et al. [48, 49] proposed the concept of cloudlet, which can be used as an intermediate layer among the terminal devices, edge cloud platforms and centralized data centers. Bonomi et al. [50, 51] proposed that cloud nodes located on the edge of the network can provide new applications and services, especially for wireless big data and Internet of things services. Cisco [52] developed the first commercial fog device, which can be hosted on an operating system running on a virtual machine hypervisor. Hu et al. [53] confirmed that edge computing can achieve computationally intensive and highly interactive applications in WiFi networks, and greatly improve latency. Bastug et al. [54] proposed an active caching scheme, and the experimental results show that backhaul can be saved as high as 22%. Vallati et al. [55] evaluated three different deployment modes for fog nodes connected to LTE networks: macro based, device to device (D2D) based, and traditional deployment. Gazis et al. [56] proposed an adaptive operation platform for fog components in industrial networking environments. Bonomi et al. [57] proposed that geographical distribution can be used as the fourth dimension of big data characteristics. Ahmed et al. [58] proposed that edge networks can acquire analyze real-time data from ubiquitous installations of sensor devices, thus smart parking and traffic control can actually be done.
Differential Privacy
Many efforts have been made about differential privacy. Dwork et al. [59] took the lead in proposing differential privacy and implementing the privacy preserving. Alhadidi et al. [60] proposed a differential privacy-based bidirectional protocol for publishing partitioned data. Goryczka et al. [61] presented a differential privacy concept that constrains the number of common aspects in a distributed anonymous manner. Xiao et al. [62] presented a data publishing method with differential privacy, and provided accurate answers for count queries. McSherry and Mironov [63] addressed the differential privacy preserving in collective user behavior.
Recently, differential privacy [64] has often been used to protect privacy of machine learning. Many works have been done on adding differential privacy for shallow machine learning models [25, 26, 36, 37, 59 ]. Shokri and Shmatikov [25] proposed a differential privacy-based distributed SGD algorithm. Abadi et al. [36] further improved the privacy loss of SGD in terms of injecting noise. Jagannathan et al. [65] used random forest method to protect privacy.
Moreover, limited researches have focused on correlated differential privacy. Kifer et al. [23] proposed that the privacy of published data would be more easily to be compromised if the correlated records were ignored. Cao [21] proposed the establishment of function model to analyze and recognize correlated records. Zhu et al. [22] made a complete definition of correlated datasets, and investigated and expounded the privacy challenges faced by correlated datasets. Chen et al. [66] used the characteristics of correlated datasets to deal with privacy issues in social networks.
Nevertheless, our work differs from these state-of-art in the following aspects. We focus on the privacy protection of the training datasets in wireless big data scenario. Considering the privacy issues of the correlated datasets presented in the existing work, we prove that differential privacy can achieve excellent and reliable privacy protection for correlated datasets through rigorous mathematical derivation.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a machine learning approach with differential privacy for preserving training datasets privacy, and apply this machine learning approach to smart edges in wireless big data scenario. We first design two different algorithms OPP and OJP to satisfy differential privacy by adding Laplacian mechanism. In addition, we consider the privacy issues of correlated datasets, and prove the differential privacy preserving of correlated datasets via theoretical analysis. Last but not least, we establish the experiments on the Tensorflow, and evaluate our methods on four different datasets. We compare our OPP and OJP algorithms with two benchmark protocols, i.e., SGD, PATE-G. The experiment results show that the proposed methods can achieve high quality privacy preserving and accuracy assurance.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Theorem 3. If Z(.) is strongly convex and second derivable, the loss function s(.) satisfies the convexity of all sample data A and is derivable, then the algorithm OJP satisfies ε p -differential privacy. Proof : Suppose that u p is the output of the algorithm OJP. Making the derivation of u p on both sides of Eq. (23), and make it equal to 0, then we can obtain
Making derivation of loss function, we have
Calculating the density function of u p , we have
where K(u p → q/D) and K(u p → q /D ) are the Jacobian determinant of u p to b, µ(q/D) and µ(q /D ) are the density function of the q under different inputs, respectively. According to Eq. (59), we can obtain the rth coordinates of the vector q
When the given dataset is D, (r,k) is the input of Jacobian determinant [31] : 
Suppose that S = K(u p → q/D), -(S + Q) = K(u p → q /D ). According to Theorem 2, we have
Assuming that the loss function is convex and second derivable, any eigenvalue of matrix R is not less than n(λ + ∆). Then, for r = 1,2, we have λ j (I + S −1 Q) λi(Q) n(λ+∆) . By using triangle inequality, we can obtain
Since |λ 1 E| + |λ 2 E| 2c, and |λ 1 E| · |λ 2 E| c 2 , we have 
To summarize, we have q − q = y n s (y n u T p x n )x n − y n s (y n u
then
According to the definition of density function, we have
Stated thus, we can obtain
